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Abstract
This article examines the creation and implementation of pretrial Special Administrative
Measures [SAMs], a version of pretrial solitary confinement now used most often to confine
terror suspects in the federal criminal justice system. Through an in-depth archival study, this
article brings attention to the importance of 20th century criminal justice trends to the 21st
century response to the threat of terrorism, including an increasingly preventive focus and
decreasing judicial checks on executive action. The findings suggest that practices believed to be
excessive responses to the threat of terrorism are in fact a natural outgrowth of late modern
criminal justice.

Introduction
In Spring of 2007, Syed Fahad Hashmi was extradited to the United States and
immediately placed in solitary confinement.1 Hashmi had been arrested in the United Kingdom
nearly a year prior to his extradition, and accused of involvement in terrorism.2 The conditions
of his confinement in the United States were not limited simply to normal solitary confinement—
three months after his extradition he was placed under Special Administrative Measures [SAMs]3
whereby his visits from his family and attorneys (the only visits he was permitted) were

1

Letter to Attorney General Michael Mukasey from the Brennan Center for Justice, 10/20/2008,
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/301ff4d661c066cf21_p7m6brynx.pdf hereafter “Brennan
Letter.”
2
Id.
3
Democracy Now transcript “’Guantanamo At Home’: Muslim American Syed Fahad Hashmi
Held in 23-Hour Pre.-Trial Solitary Confinement for Over Two Years in Case Resting on PleaBargaining Government Informant.” Originally aired 6/5/09. Available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/6/5/hashmi hereafter “Guantanamo At Home.”
2
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monitored, all communication with media outlets was forbidden, any news via television or radio
was forbidden, and he was allowed newspapers only after a 30-day delay.4 His family visits
were limited to one visit, from one family member, every other week, and subjected to the
bureaucratic difficulties of the Bureau of Prison’s monitoring practices, such that these visits
might be forgone if the Bureau of Prisons translator failed to appear at the appointed time.5 He
was subjected to a strip search before his one hour per day of exercise, which eventually led him
to choose to forego leaving his cell altogether.6 According to Hashmi’s brother, even his own
speech (presumably to himself) within his cell was restricted.7 Three years into Hashmi’s
confinement, his brother was quoted as saying that the limited family visits had been impossible
for five months.8
The conditions of confinement allowed under SAMs are exceptionally harsh. After two
and a half years in solitary, Hashmi’s supporters believed his mental health was deteriorating,
stating he looked “frail” and “jittery.”9 This conforms well to the criticisms that have been
lodged at the use of solitary confinement in the terrorism context and elsewhere—critics argue
that the use of solitary confinement should be deemed a violation of the Eighth Amendment due

4

Brennan Letter, supra note 1.
Democracy Now transcript “Guantanamo At Home,” supra note 3.
6
Open Letter from Amnesty International USA, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the
Council on American Islamic Relations-NY on the upcoming trial of Syed Fahad Hashmi and the
severe Special Administrative Measures to which he is subjected, 4/23/10, available at
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2010/04/23-2 .
7
Democracy Now, “Guantanamo At Home,” supra note 3.
8
Democracy Now “After 3 Years in Pretrial Solitary Confinement, Fahad Hashmi Pleads Guilty
on Eve of Terror Trial.” 4/28/10. Available at
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/28/after_3_years_in_pretrial_solitary.
9
Democracy Now “Hashmi Remains in Solitary Confinement as Trial Delayed.” 12/8/09.
Available at http://www.democracynow.org/2009/12/8/headlines#15 .
5
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to the extreme mental and emotional harm it inflicts on inmates.10 SAMs are a form of
Administrative Supermaximum Security confinement (ADMAX), in which the conditions of
confinement are based on the danger that inmates pose (according to the BOP, and often based
on the inmate’s status as a gang member). Because ADMAX is status-based it is indefinite in
duration, so that prisoners who are believed to be dangerous may be housed in ADMAX for their
entire prison sentence.11. Because it is administrative, it is subject to little, if any, judicial
oversight.12 In the case of SAMs, this status is meant to be based on a determination that SAMs
are reasonably necessary, either to “protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily
injury,”or to “prevent disclosure of classified information.”13
But Hashmi was held under SAMs without any claim that he posed this type of
immediate danger. He had provided aid to terrorists, in the form of socks, blankets, money and
the use of a phone, but there was no claim that he himself would or could engage in terrorist acts,
or direct others to do so.14 This made him a focal point for criticism of the “reflexive” use of

See, e.g. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement. 29 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 124 (2003); Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary
Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115 (2009); Holly Boyer, Home Sweet
Hell: An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as Applied
to Supermax Prisons, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 317 (2003); Christine Rebman, Eighth Amendment and
Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 567 (1999-2000); Bryan Walton, Eighth Amendment and Psychological Implications of
Solitary Confinement, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 271 (1997); Atul Gawande, “Hellhole.” The
New Yorker March 30, 2009. Available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/090330fa_fact_gawande ; Jeffrey Kluger
“Are Prisons Driving Prisoners Mad?” Time Magazine Jan. 26, 2007 Available At
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1582304,00.html .
11
Haney, Id.
12
Keramet Ann Reiter, The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary
Confinement in U.S. Prisons 1960-2006. 57 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 71 (2012);
Van Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights: The Failure of Negotiated Governance in the Prison
Inmate Grievance Process. 96 CAL. L. REV. 1353 (2008).
13
(28 CFR 501- 501.3(a)).
14
U.S. v. Warsame transcript of sentencing, 7/9/2009, on file with author.
10
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pretrial solitary confinement in terrorism cases.15 Other SAMs cases offer further clues that
SAMs are being applied unthinkingly and without oversight, such as the imposition of SAMs on
one defendant whose judge determined outright that he posed no immediate danger,16 or the
statement by a prosecutor, when SAMs were questioned, that SAMs were, to his understanding
“the way all material support defendants were held,” regardless of the specific allegations against
those defendants.17 Because of this reflexive use, as well as the harsh nature of the confinement,
SAMs are repeatedly cited as an example of the striking deviation from normal criminal
procedure that, critics assert, characterizes the criminal justice system’s response to the threat of
terrorism and the terrorist attacks of 2001.18
SAMs may indeed serve as an example of post-2001 responses to terrorism, but their
explanatory power lies in their consistency with prior practices rather than their exceptionalism.
While the claim that “9/11 changed everything” has seemed ubiquitous and axiomatic in recent
years, this article joins those of a minority of scholars who have associated post-2001 tactics with

Kareem Fahim Restrictive Terms of Prisoner's Confinement Add Fuel to Debate” The New
York Times February 5, 2009 pg. A27.
16
U.S. v. Warsame transcript of sentencing, 7/9/2009, on file with author.
17
U.S. v. Sadequee, transcript of proceedings, 3/3/2009 at 43, on file with author.
18
Heena Musabji and Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on Muslims
in America, 1 DEPAUL H. SOC. JUST. 83 (2007-2008); Susan Akram & Maritza Karmel,
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and
Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference? 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 609 (2004-2005); Sadiq Reza, Unpatriotic Acts: An Introduction, 48 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
3 (2003-2004); Sam A. Schmidt and Joshua Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s
Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N. Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 69 (2003-2004); Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case:
How Secrecy and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 81 (2003-2004); J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United
States: What September 11 Taught Us About Defending Them, 18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L. J. 129
(2002).
15
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pre-2001 trends and efforts on the part of law enforcement agents.19 While these works examine
counter-terror and criminal justice trends more broadly, this article is among the first to provide
an in-depth study of the development of what has been identified as an example of post-2001
counter-terror excess.

As this article will show, the use of SAMs did change as the judiciary

abandoned oversight of government claims of dangerousness in order to allow the reflexive use
of pretrial solitary confinement in the case of “dangerous” defendants, but this change was
established prior to September 11, 2001. Moreover, this sea change is better understood as
another aspect of the increasing informalism and decreasing judicial oversight of the criminal
justice system as a whole, rather than a response to a war-like threat.
This article analyzes the increasingly reflexive use of SAMs in the late 20th century. I
begin with the origins of SAMs as a response to high level organized crime defendants more than
a decade prior to the terror attacks of 2001, and follow the development of SAMs to its
increasing use in terrorism-related cases at the turn of the 21st century, in order to demonstrate
the conventional criminal justice roots of this 21st century counter-terror tactic.
Rather than a response to terrorism, this article locates the creation and development of
SAMs in conventional criminal justice developments that were ongoing, and well known, at the

19

Mary L. Dudziak. SEPTEMBER 11 IN HISTORY: A WATERSHED MOMENT? (2003); John Hagan
“Twin Towers, Iron Cages and the Culture of Control” in M. Matravers (ed.) MANAGING
MODERNITY: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2005); John Parry, Terrorism and the
New Criminal Process. 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2007); Robert Chesney and Jack
Goldsmith Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60
STANF. L. REV. 1079 (2007); David Cole and James Dempsey, TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY. (2006);
James Forman Jr. Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on
Terror Possible 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009); Colin Dayan, THE STORY OF THE
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (2007); Chesney, Robert. The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws
and the Demands of Prevention. HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION (2005).
6
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turn of the 21st century. Below I briefly outline the methodology I used to study SAMs, which
are often hidden and may be difficult to uncover. I then turn to key critiques of the criminal
justice system made by scholars in the late 20th century. I also discuss the place of supermax
facilities and solitary confinement in this history of U.S. criminal justice in late modernity. I
then turn to SAMs. In particular, I focus on two post- 2001 cases which exemplify the critiques
of SAMs and the ways in which SAMs are believed to avoid traditional criminal justice
protections. I then look to the history and development of SAMs practice, and find that these
traditional protections were long gone in SAMs practice prior to 2001. Moreover, their gradual
diminishment is linked to the broader criminal justice developments that have been noted by
scholars for several decades. I conclude that SAMs are more closely linked to late 20th century
criminal justice practices than to early 21st century responses to terrorism, and I suggest that this
may be true for many other supposed “changes” in response to the terror attacks of 2001.
Researching SAMs
As with many aspects of the response to terrorism in the 21st century, analysis of SAMs
policy is fraught with difficulty because of its hidden nature. The practice of SAMs has been
shrouded in secrecy, making it very difficult to know precisely how the practice works or has
worked over time. The Department of Justice has acknowledged that 46 federal prisoners are
being held under SAMs, of which 26 are charged in association with terrorism and 28 are held in
the Supermax facility in Florence, Colorado,20 but it has refused to disclose the names of the
prisoners who are or have been so held. Moreover, this number changes seemingly constantly,

See Basil Katz, “After 18 years, terrorist seeks reason for special detention.” Thompson
Reuters, July 1, 2011. Available at
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/06__June/After_16_years,_terrorist_seeks_reason_for_special_detention/ .
20

7

Forthcoming, 51 (1) Criminal Law Bulletin ___ (2014)

both as new defendants are arrested and as defendants are moved out of SAMs and into other
forms of confinement (generally into other forms of confinement where communication is still
limited but some time spent outside of isolation is allowed). 21 The lack of names creates severe
difficulties in researching SAMs, as does the fact that SAMs normally include restrictions on
communications of lawyers and visitors to SAMs prisoners. This means that even family
members of prisoners may not be allowed to discuss the conditions under which SAMs prisoners
are being held. Motions and rulings concerning SAMs are often sealed, as are transcripts.
This article relies on the legal challenges, judicial opinions, and media reports that have
escaped this secrecy. By searching through legal filings and news stories for telltale words such
as SHU (special housing unit), solitary, lockdown, and various specific conditions of
confinement associated with SAMs as my research revealed those conditions, I was able to
identify several dozen SAMs convicts and defendants. The arguments and rulings in these cases
tell the story of the development of SAMs. They identify SAMs not as an overreaction to
terrorism, but as part of the broader overreaction to crime in general that characterized the late
20th century.
I rely on the motions of attorneys and opinions of judges to gauge the accepted practices
of the federal criminal courts. In so doing, I do not assume that judges, prosecutors, or defense

21

In 2009, the Department of Justice acknowledged that (at that time) 44 prisoners federal were
being held under SAMs, of which 29 were charged in association with terrorism (Department of
Justice Fact Sheet, June 9, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag564.html .) In February of 2009, a Department of Justice spokesperson stated that there were
46 such inmates, 30 of which were associated with terrorism. Six of those prisoners, four of
whom were terrorism-associated, had not yet been convicted of the crimes with which they were
charged. Kareem Fahim, Restrictive Terms of Prisoners’ Confinement Add Fuel to Debate,
supra note 15. Attorney General Eric Holder has described the movement between more and less
harsh versions of communication management isolation in his motion for summary judgement in
the case of Ayyad v. Holder (filed March 25, 2011).
8
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attorneys are either honest or straightforward regarding the reasons for their actions. Rather, I
assume that their actions give some insight to what they believe will work in the criminal justice
system. In other words, prosecutors put forward that information that they believe will be
deemed sufficient to achieve the result they want, i.e. the imposition of SAMs, while defense
attorneys put forward those arguments which they believe will give their clients the best chance
of removal from SAMs, and judges’ formal opinions give the amount of information they believe
necessary in order to make their decision legitimate in the eyes of observers, most importantly
higher level (appellate) judges. These arguments and opinions, then, give insight into the way in
which participants in the criminal justice system perceive the requirements, norms, and values of
that system. Perhaps more importantly, in the case of the criminal justice system, these
arguments constitute the system itself, as the acceptance of norms and priorities, represented in
judicial opinions, becomes precedent and therefore law in future cases.
In this way, I analyzed the development of SAMs practice, from a new and mistrusted
technique of preventive detention, to an accepted and even assumed practice. I looked for the
key moments and characteristics of this development in order to determine whether this practice
belongs in the category of late modern criminal justice, or post-2001 counter-terror
exceptionalism. My findings suggest that SAMs fit quite well in the former grouping.
But SAMs are not merely a form of confinement in the federal criminal justice system,
entirely removed from more extreme tactics that characterize the U.S. government’s response to
terrorism since 2001. SAMs are a microcosm of the values and priorities that characterize the
post 2001 response to terrorism. They allow harsh treatment of persons who have not been
convicted of any crime, and they are applied, seemingly, with no check on executive claims or
authority. They represent the valuing of public safety over any other rights or interests, even
9
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where the alleged threat to public safety consists of a claimed (but unproven) association rather
than any proven activity or intent. In short, the criticisms of SAMs are the criticisms of post2001 counter-terror practices.
For this reason, SAMs present an excellent case study in the evolution of counter-terror
policies, and as a case study they suggest that the supposed exceptionalism of post-2001 U.S.
policies has been vastly overrated. Instead, this article suggests, the harsh and unchecked
counter-terror tactics of the U.S. government post-2001 originated in the harsh and unchecked
crime control tactics of the U.S. government in the late 20th century.
Background
Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, scholars, activists, and government defenders have
chronicled the entrance of the U.S. government into a state of exception. Authors have debated
the necessity of the countless changes that followed 2001, arguing over should, or could, have
been avoided. Whether or not civil liberties can withstand warlike attacks, how the rule of law
should respond to an extreme threat, and whether or not the U.S. government’s exceptional
response can be justified, have become favorite topics for scholars of all disciplines. Changes
believed to have been brought about by this one horrendous attack have run the gamut, from

10
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torture torture22 to torts,23 from securities regulation24 to surveillance and civil liberties,25 from
the nature of war26 to the nature of racism.27
The breadth of changes linked to the 2001 attacks makes it difficult to generalize, yet
some overarching trends are clearly present. Most apparent is the critique of “ever-expanding
justifications for the assertion of executive and unilateral power.”28 According to this critique,
the U.S. government has acquired the power to infringe on the lives and liberties of persons who
would have been safe from government intrusion prior to the 2001 attacks, either through
strategic use of those attacks or through genuine efforts to protect the public. Whether by relying
on “guilt by association,”29 or justifying actions as efforts to prevent and preempt terrorist
attacks,30 the fundamental change in everything since 2001 is, these authors claim, the ability of
the government to unilaterally act without checks or oversight.
But to what extent did these checks exist prior to 2001? As Kim Lane Scheppele notes,
many of the post-2001 changes in policy, even those she herself highlights, were simply

22

See, e.g., Hajjar, Lisa. Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice in
Historical and Global Perspective, ANNUAL REV. OF L. AND SOC. SCIENCE (2009).
23
George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11 World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 175,
188 (2007)
24
Mary L. Schapiro, The Regulation of the Securities Industry in the Wake of the 9/11 Tragedy, 7
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2001).
25
Matthew J. Morgan, ed., THE LEGAL IMPACT OF 9/11 AND THE NEW LEGAL LANDSCAPE: THE
DAY THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING? (2009).
26
James Wirtz and James A. Russell, U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption. THE
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 113-123 (Spring 2003).
27
Thomas Ross, Whiteness After 9/11, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 223, 225 (2005)
28
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations
of 9/11. 6 U. PENN. J. OF CON. L. 1001 (2004).
29
David Cole The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War in Terrorism. 38 HARV.
CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (2003); Robert Chesney, Civil Liberties and the
Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1409
(2003).
30
Chesney, Id.; Wirtz and Russell, supra note 26.
11
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codifications of pre-2001 practices that had already gained judicial approval, while others were
changes to internal checks and policies, rather than avoidance of external oversight. Similarly,
the “guilt by association” critique is one that preceded the 2001 attacks.31 Even the use of
rendition, the process by which terrorist detainees were transferred to black sites in order to be
tortured into providing information, began in 1996 when suspects were rendered to countries
with questionable human rights records in order to be questioned.32
Reaching beyond specific policies, the overarching trend of decreasing checks on the
executive branch and increasing avenues for unilateral executive action is one that has been well
established by punishment scholars over the past several decades. Just as in the terrorism
context, these decreasing checks are justified by the prioritization of prevention and public
safety. In perhaps the most cited work on modern criminal justice, David Garland describes a
cultural crisis based on a perpetual sense of disorder and confusion. He describes a perpetual
fear that leads to a desperate desire for the state to protect the public. At the same time, modern
criminological theories viewing crime as rational and opportunistic, and viewing rehabilitation as
impossible or undesireable,33 lead to a focus on prevention. Concerns for the rights of offenders
steadily decrease in the face of an overly emotional public that refuses to identify with
criminals.34
The abandonment of the criminal other and prioritization of prevention is evident in the
public’s uncaring response to the government’s practice of punishing without proving guilt.

31

Cole, supra note 29.
Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's 'Extraordinary Rendition'
Program. THE NEW YORKER, February 8, 2005, p. 106.
33
Andrew Von Hirsch. DOING JUSTICE. (1976).
34
David Garland, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001)
32

12
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Community based policing, workplace drug testing, increased police presence, as well as
increased stops, frisks and arrests, all clearly prior to any determination of guilt, create a new
form of punishment, avoiding oversight by functioning as administrative “management of
dangerous populations” rather than a new form of criminal justice.35
Much like the terrorism context, the increasing desire for preventive interventions results
in the use of “end runs”36 or “short cuts”37 around the criminal justice system and its required
procedural protections. These alternate paths to detention, such as the use of immigration
detention and civil commitment for sex offenders, allow the government to bypass judicial
checks by turning to an administrative forum where oversight is less rigorous. These practices
are unremarked upon as a necessary aspect of the preventive regime, supported by public and
government backlash against stringent due process protections enacted in the 1960s and 70s
which lessened the preventive and efficient processing of criminal justice.38
However, the desire for efficient processing of criminals reaches even into the criminal
courts, the supposed bastion of procedural checks, as loitering statutes and other responses to
gang violence allow for incarceration based on guilt by association, increased preventive

35

Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOL. 449 (1992); Jonathan Simon GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND
CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Bernard Harcourt, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007).
36
Katherine Beckett and Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: Toward an
Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment. THEORETICAL CRIMINOL. 1 (2012).
37
Nicola Lacey The Resurgence of Character: Criminal Responsibility in the Context of
Criminalisation. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIM.L L. 151 (2011).
38
Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, Defending the criminal law: Reflections on the changing
character of crime, procedure, and sanctions. CRIM. L. AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (2007).
13
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intervention, and detention with decreased checks.39 In more traditional criminal prosecutions,
criminal courts turn towards efficient processing of defendants who are presumed to be guilty,
which requires increasing informalism and decreasing checks on the executive (once provided by
traditional due process protections).40
In other words, late modern criminal justice was well on its way to finding opportunities
for unilateral executive action in the interests of public safety, long before the terror attacks of
2001. This has been noted by some few scholars who have discussed the predecessors of post2001 counter-terror.41 Parry42 Foreman,43 and Dayan44 all relate the use of torture to the harsh
nature of pre-2001 criminal justice practices. Dayan specifically examines the jurisprudence of
the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment as a predecessor for acceptance of
the use of torture, while Parry and Foreman more broadly look to Garland’s “Culture of Control”
and the general punitiveness of crime control in late modernity without specifically following
any one doctrine. Cole and Dempsey, and Chesney and Goldsmith generally acknowledge the
beginnings of the use of deportation to avoid criminal justice and increased resemblance between

39

Carole Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 771 (1998);
Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice,
114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
40
Wolfgang Heydebrand and Carroll Seron. RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1990); William Stuntz, Law and Grace, 98 VA. L. REV. 367
(2012).
41
See not 18, supra.
42
John Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process. 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765
(2007).
43
James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on
Terror Possible 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331 (2009).
44
Colin Dayan, THE STORY OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (2007).
14
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military and civilian justice systems prior to 2001, respectively, but focus instead on the increase
in those trends since 2001.45
Yet the brief literature review above suggests that late modern criminal justice may bear
far more responsibility for our 21st century counter-terror policies than has been acknowledged
thus far. While an exhaustive examination of post-2001 policies is beyond the scope of any
single article, this article begins the process of examining the origins of 21st Century counterterror practices without assuming that these practices began in the 21st Century. This article
looks to the use of SAMs as a starting point for this discussion.
As noted above, SAMs have been continually recognized as a central aspect of the
supposed changes to the U.S. criminal justice system since 2001. They are an exceptionally
harsh form of punishment, arguably the harshest form of confinement used in the U.S. today.
Moreover, the ADMAX facilities they employ were a model for “one of the worst solitary
confinement facilities at Guantanamo.”46 They have been used as precedent by government
actors seeking to justify the continuing impositions on attorney client privilege and pretrial
research experienced by detainees and their counsel at Guantanamo.47

45

Cole, David, and James Dempsey, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2006); Chesney, Robert, and Jack Goldsmith.
Terrorism and the convergence of criminal and military detention models. 60 STAN. L. REV.
1079 (2007).
46
Vincent Warren, "Shut Down the Whole Thing." NEW YORK TIMES.COM, ROOM FOR DEBATE,
May 1: Available at http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/18/should-obama-closeguantanamo-and-end-military-tribunals/close-guantanamo-and-shut-down-the-commissions;
Jeffrey Ian Ross and Dawn L. Rothe, "Guantanamo: America's Foreign Supermax in the Fight
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Additionally, SAMs represent an apex in criminal justice end-runs around the
burdensome requirements of criminal procedure. SAMs consistently interfere with defendants’
trial preparation. Non-contact visits combine with limitations on reading materials to inhibit
defendants from looking at trial materials with their attorneys, as the barrier between defendant
and attorney results in only one person having the material at a time. Restrictions on media that
defendants can see may lead to relevant information being missed. Moreover, attorneys
complain that the psychological deterioration that accompanies solitary confinement leads to an
inability of defendants to focus on the material issues in their cases. All of this undermines the
ability of defendants to engage in defending themselves, thereby lessening the adversarial
character of the (supposed) looming trial.48 Worse, defendants suffering from desperation in the
face of continued solitary confinement are likely to plead guilty, simply to shorten their stay in
solitary confinement. In this way, SAMs may well coerce defendants into pleading guilty.49
Altogether, SAMs severely undermine the ultimate adversarial check on executive action – the
adversarial criminal trial.
But most importantly, the imposition of this exceedingly harsh detention on defendants
such as Hashmi, with no apparent demonstration of necessity for their imposition, shows the lack
of oversight and the extent of unilateral executive reach that is the hallmark of post-2001
counter-terror tactics. The harsh nature of SAMs, the difficulties they create for trial preparation,
and the pressure the apply to defendants to plead guilty all clearly accompany any use of pretrial
supermaximum security solitary confinement, which preceded 2001 and was used in high level

Sam A. Schmidt and Joshua Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s Secrecy and
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organized crime cases. The question is, is the reflexive application of SAMs truly a change in
response to the terror attacks of 2001?
The answer is, no. As the following sections will show, SAMs must be examined in light
of the transition to a punitive and yet administrative, preventive, risk-averse, and therefore
deferential criminal justice system. SAMs belong in this late modern criminal justice system,
both historically and ideologically.

This suggests that we may find criminal justice roots for

other aspects of the response to terrorism in the 21st Century.
The following sections describe the development of SAMs.
The Birth of SAMs
Although it appears to have been generally forgotten, 50 the use of pretrial solitary
confinement to control a dangerous defendant predates both the codification of SAMs and the
modern concern with terror defendants. In 1988, Bureau of Prisons regulations already allowed
for the use of solitary in the form of administrative detention, including “when the inmate's
continued presence in the general population poses a serious threat to life, property, self, staff,
other inmates or to the security or orderly running of the institution and when the inmate… [i]s
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pending investigation or trial for a criminal act.” 51 The regulation was unquestionably in use by
1991, when John Gotti and his codefendants, successfully challenged their 23 hour per day
solitary confinement as they awaited trial on charges that included witness tampering, multiple
murders, solicitation and conspiracy to commit murder.52 El-Sayyid Nosair, a primary defendant
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing prosecution, was held in administrative detention after
his indictment in that case; his challenge to the conditions of his confinement was unsuccessful.53
Defendants in the above cases had been given, and made use of, the due process
procedures required by 28 C.F.R. 541 (governing administrative solitary confinement); namely
notice of reasons for detention within 24 hours, a hearing if detention lasts greater than seven
days, and periodic reviews thereafter.54 Use of the regulation, however, was not strictly
necessary in order to house a defendant in solitary confinement pending trial. Augusto Falcone
was transferred to USP Marion, a maximum security facility, while awaiting trial for his
activities “as a drug ‘Kingpin’” for importing 75 kilos of cocaine into the United States and
operating a criminal enterprise.55 His 1994 challenge to his solitary confinement was
unsuccessful in part due of the judge’s determination that Falcone was not being held in
administrative solitary; Falcone had merely been transferred to a facility where “[a]ll inmates…
are housed in single-man cells, and most are restricted to their cells for 23 hours per day.”56
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SAMs as such were officially introduced to the BOP in October of 1995, in the form of
an interim rule allowing for “special administrative measures that are reasonably necessary to
prevent disclosure of classified information… include placing the inmate in administrative
detention and/or limiting certain privileges, including, but not limited to, correspondence,
visiting, and use of telephone.”57 This somewhat vague rule, specifically limited to national
security cases and the threat of divulging classified information, went into effect immediately,58
received no public comment and was eventually codified in 1997.59
It was the second half of the SAMs rule that received the most publicity and response,
leading most authors to date SAMs as originating in 1996.60 In May of 1996 a regulation
allowing for the implementation of “special administrative procedures that are reasonably
necessary to protect persons against the risk of death or serious bodily injury” were first codified
as an interim rule with request for comments.61 The rule was effective immediately.62
Allowable restrictions to be placed on inmates were almost identical to those suggested in 1995
regarding classified information, with the addition of an explicit reference to limitations on
“interviews with representatives of the news media.”63
As an administrative regulation, and (as will be discussed in the following section) as was
the case with all administrative solitary confinement, the practice had little judicial oversight to
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begin with. Administrative actions are generally subjected to more deferential judicial review,
and this is even more the case where prison regulations are concerned.64 The decision to place
an inmate under SAMs was (and still is) to be made initially by the Attorney General with no
non-executive oversight whatsoever. SAMs were to be
implemented upon written notification to the Director, Bureau of Prisons, by the
Attorney General or, at the Attorney General's direction, by the head of a federal
law enforcement agency, or the head of a member agency of the United States
intelligence community, that there is a substantial risk that a prisoner's
communications or contacts with persons could result in death or serious bodily
injury to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail the risk of
death or serious bodily injury to persons.65
The limitations implemented in accordance with SAMs were to be allowed in 120 day
increments, renewable upon “additional written notification” from the same designated persons
“that the circumstances identified in the original notification continue to exist.”66 All of this left
the imposition of SAMs completely in the hands of the executive branch, with a hypothetical67
path of review via the Administrative Remedy Program68 and further review by the judiciary
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after all administrative options had been exhausted.69 The hearing provided in earlier
administrative detention regulations was noticeably absent.70
Judges overseeing SAMs cases immediately acknowledged that these limitations
amounted to solitary confinement, and that they applied to all persons in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons, including defendants awaiting trial.71 Early cases mentioning SAMs
described the conditions under which the prisoner was being held as “confined in special
housing, i.e., solitary confinement;”72 a second described the unit in which the prisoner was held
by stating “prisoners are kept essentially in solitary confinement;”73 a third noted that the
defendant (who was not yet convicted) “was subject to solitary confinement for the first 15
months of his detention,”74 a fourth described the prisoner’s placement “into administrative
segregation in an isolated soundproof cell.”75 Each of these cases predated the attacks of 2001.
Following the September 11th attacks, the regulation was almost immediately modified in
the form of an interim rule, however the modifications were, in practice, fairly limited, with one
exception. The new interim rule allowed for the monitoring of attorney-client conversations.76
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While this led to substantial criticism, the option to monitor attorney-client conversations does
not appear to have ever been used.77
Several additional, but perhaps less notable modifications were included as well. The
regulation was amended to allow for an initial detention of up to one year before the
dangerousness of a prisoner had to be reevaluated.78 Certainly, it is possible that this had a
substantive effect on inmates held under SAMs, however in practice it appears unlikely. Wadih
El-Hage, for instance, who was held prior to the modification, received a modification to his
SAMs whereby he was no longer held in pure solitary confinement after 15 months—which
would not appear to be in conjunction with a 120 day review period.79 Later defendants awaiting
trial remained under SAMs for years at a time, through numerous review periods, at times having
their SAMs removed and then reinstated arguably unnecessarily.80
Additionally, while the listed subject of the regulation remained “prisoners,”81 a
definition of “inmate” was added in order to make clear that the regulation reached both persons
charged and persons convicted.82 Finally, a section was added making clear that the Bureau of
Prisons need not have custody of the individual, other agencies holding prisoners of the
Department of Justice (for instance, U.S. Marshalls) might implement similar conditions of
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detention.83 These regulations remained in the form of an interim rule until their final
codification in 2007.84 At that point, commentary accompanying the final rule made clear that
renewing SAMs “should not require a de novo review, but only a determination that there is a
continuing need for the imposition of special administrative measures in light of the
circumstances.”85
Comments on the interim rule specifically requested a description of the administrative
procedures by which an inmate could challenge his or her SAMs.86 This request was denied, and
inmates were directed to the Administrative Remedy Program already in place. 87 The
requirement to exhaust administrative remedies remained a bone of contention in almost every
SAMs challenge that was brought to court.88 Of course, while defendants worked their way
through the administrative process, they remained in solitary confinement with SAMs in place.
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While the above has outlined the creation and amendment of SAMs regulations, the
existence of pretrial solitary confinement of dangerous defendants prior to the implementation of
SAMs regulations suggests that the use of administrative supermaximum security solitary
confinement [ADMAX] should inform any analysis of SAMs. Indeed, the increasing use of
ADMAX facilities aligns quite well, chronologically, with the creation and transformation of
SAMs. Accordingly, the following section offers a brief overview of the history of ADMAX.
Setting the stage for SAMs—the ADMAX explosion
It will come as no surprise to practitioners, or to students and scholars of contemporary
technologies of punishment, that SAMs appeared during the 1980s and 90s, as the flourishing
use of ADMAX facilities was well underway during this period. But the tendency to date
practices used in connection with terrorism cases from either 2001 or 1996 suggests a need to
recollect the history of ADMAX. In fact, it is generally the use of ADMAX facilities and
practices that are authorized as SAMs—SAMs practice is ADMAX practice, SAMs challenges
are ADMAX challenges, and SAMs law is ADMAX law.
While states began building ADMAX facilities in the 1980s, Keramet Reiter and Craig
Haney have connected their origins to the criminal justice developments of the late 1960s and
70s.89 According to Reiter, the creation and preservation of ADMAX facilities may be directly
linked to federal prisoners’ rights litigation in these decades. As courts specified necessary
protections for prisoners, prison administrators responded by addressing the letter, rather than
spirit of these requirements. Administrators responded to courts’ admonishments regarding
prison conditions by building new, pristine, technologically advanced cells that could not be
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criticized in this manner. Advancing technologies allowed prison administrators to address the
need for out of cell time, medical intervention, and similar tangible needs without increasing
actual human contact, or in fact while decreasing that contact. By the time prisoners’ litigation
could respond to these developments, the rehabilitative ideal had disappeared from prisons,
replaced by a steadily increasing willingness of judges to defer to the administrative
determinations of prison officials, particularly regarding prison safety.90 Moreover, prison
administrators were able to respond to challenges that they were abiding by every letter of
courts’ prior rulings,91 and that their own grievance procedures (a form of “cosmetic
compliance” with former rights-protective court rulings) should be relied on in order to rectify
any remaining problems92.
Haney turns directly to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal, and the advancing
tendency to view crime and criminals as a problem to be managed rather than resolved. This
general criminal justice trend was compounded due to the steadily increasing prison population,
which caused massive overcrowding, in turn causing disciplinary complications. ADMAX
facilities enabled the management of this increasing population, arguably unnecessarily, while
providing some level of ammunition to politicians looking to court voters by appearing “tough
on crime.” (Haney, 2003)
In other words, ADMAX may be seen as an outgrowth of the deferential posture
accorded to criminal justice officials by the judiciary, originating in a public-safety oriented
criminal justice system and political body that had turned away from prisoners’ rights in favor of
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prevention and management of criminal activity. In the case of ADMAX, this originated with
the public safety rhetoric of the 1980s, and “flourished” in the 1990s.93 By 1991, when Gotti
lodged his successful challenge to his ADMAX housing, the ADMAX boom was well underway.
“Super maximum security” prison facilities existed or were being built in more than half the
states in the country.94 Courts were steadily accepting these facilities, due to the meticulousness
of their creation and the generally increasing deference that judges were willing to accord prison
administrators.
In this context, the creation and acceptance of SAMs hardly seems surprising. Yet SAMs
still may be seen as a step further than ADMAX, at least when imposed prior to trial. The
following section discusses the evolution of pretrial SAMs, from a rarely imposed and carefully
overseen exception, to the reflexive practice which it is today.

SAMS: From rare to reflexive
Scholars looking at SAMs typically date their origin at 1996,95 when the phrase “special
administrative measures” was first used in a BOP regulation. To better contextualize SAMs
practice, however, we must remember that the first regulation allowing for administrative pretrial
solitary confinement was passed in 1988,96 only one year after pretrial detention based on a
defendant’s dangerousness was determined to be constitutional by the Supreme Court. Under
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this regulation, defendants were given due process in the form of administrative checks,
including periodic reviews and a hearing if solitary confinement was to last longer than one
week.97 Perhaps more importantly, however, judges ruling on the acceptability of pretrial
solitary confinement seemed to judge the regulation as a second form of preventive detention,
and kept close watch on the justifications for the use of this extraordinary practice.
One example of this careful judicial oversight is that of John Gotti, who was held in pretrial
solitary confinement based on his alleged activities as the boss of the Gambino crime family.98
Although he was charged with several violent felonies including witness tampering, the judge in
his case found that unless some showing could be made that he was going to continue offending
from his prison cell, he could not be held in solitary confinement.99 The determination that the
charges against him were serious enough to warrant preventive detention did not necessarily lead
to a conclusion that preventive detention in solitary was called for, in spite of the fact that the
allegations against him suggested that he might continue to be a danger even while incarcerated.
A second example would be the case of Ahmad Suleiman. Suleiman was indicted in
association with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.100 Although he was only indicted for
perjury,101 allegations brought by the U.S. Attorney’s office painted a portrait of a violent
terrorist with the capability to do extreme damage. Prosecutors on Suleiman’s case claimed that
his fingerprints had been found on bomb manuals, and that he had been present in two separate
militant training areas; he had also travelled in the company of one of the men accused of the
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World Trade Center bombing.102 While the judge acknowledged that Suleiman could be a
danger if released into the general population, he maintained that this did not mean that it was
likely that Suleiman would cause harm from jail.103 Suleiman was therefore ordered released
from administrative detention and returned to the general population.104
Cases where pretrial solitary confinement was allowed show the type of evidence that judges
were looking for in these early days. El Sayyid Nosair was held in pretrial solitary confinement
based on allegations that the 1993 World Trade Center bombing had been in part an effort to
help Nosair escape prison, and that an escape plan had been in place, of which Nosair had been
aware.105 Luis Felipe, the defendant to whom most authors attribute the first SAMs case,106 was
held in pretrial solitary confinement upon evidence that while in prison he had founded the Latin
Kings and directed three successful murders, three attempted murders, and a separate murder
conspiracy.107
Comparing cases where solitary confinement was imposed to those where it was removed
shows that while administrative solitary confinement was created to be preventive, in these early
years it was a carefully monitored and limited practice, permitted only in cases where
dangerousness was well established and violence seemed extremely likely. Over the years
following, however, and after the creation of SAMs, pretrial solitary confinement became more
broadly preventive. SAMs were allowed where defendants seemed capable of dangerous acts
but no evidence was provided that they were likely to engage in them. The point at which this
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extreme intervention was allowable moved earlier and earlier, and further and further from actual
violence. Judges steadily removed themselves from the process, leaving oversight of the use of
SAMs to seemingly nonexistent BOP reviews.
Following the trend: Judges abandon oversight of SAMs
Not only do SAMs predate the 2001 terror attacks, the decision by judges to abdicate any
role they once had in overseeing SAMs application predates those attacks as well. The primary
case showing this abandonment is that of Wadih El Hage.
Wadih El Hage was indicted for perjury, but later charged with being part of the
conspiracy to bomb U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998; his involvement was primarily as financier
for al Qaeda.108 El Hage challenged his detention on the basis that there was no evidence that he
had ever been directly involved in violence, let alone that he was capable of violence from jail,
and that his detention in solitary confinement had been so long as to become punitive.109 While
the Circuit Court appeared convinced of El Hage’s involvement in violent terrorist acts,110 the
district court had already found that there was no danger of El Hage returning to violent
conspiracies if released into the general population because he had no capability to do so.111
The Second Circuit did not challenge the district court’s analysis of El Hage’s
dangerousness. In fact, the Circuit court did not discuss El Hage’s dangerousness at all. Instead,
the Circuit court found that El Hage had access to significant information, and the ability to
disclose that information. With no mention of any evidence that El Hage was likely disclose that
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information, no mention of the 1995 SAMs regulation regarding classified (rather than
significant) information, and no suggestion that the information El Hage had was classified, the
Second Circuit upheld El Hage’s SAMs on the basis of his capabilities alone.112 Acknowledging
the contrast between this case and Felipe, namely that in this case there was no evidence of the
inmate ever having engaged in dangerous communications, the Second Circuit maintained that
El-Hage was dangerous because of what “information he might communicate to others.”113 One
year prior to the 9/11 attacks, SAMs had already taken a wild leap forward in terms of earlier
intervention and preventive action. Evidence that harm was likely was apparently no longer
necessary, the possibility of harm would be sufficient to impose SAMs.
As El Hage moved SAMs practice forward in terms of increasingly early interventions,
the case of Yousef v. Reno114 significantly changed the level of judicial oversight of SAMs. It is
surprising that the Yousef case so moved SAMs doctrine; Yousef was held under SAMs after his
conviction, so there was no question as to whether he was a terrorist or had terrorist associates.
As to the risk that Yousef posed from jail, a jailhouse informant had told prosecutors that Yousef
was plotting criminal acts from jail, even turning over to prosecutors handwritten notes
containing evidence of Yousef’s schemes.115 There is little doubt that Yousef’s SAMs would
have been upheld by any judge overseeing the case, had any judge truly overseen case.
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Instead, the district court hearing Yousef’s case immediately dismissed his claims116
based on the fact that Yousef had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies via the
Administrative Remedy Program prior to appealing to the court. Yousef’s appeal to the Circuit
Court was merely a challenge of the district court’s holding. He argued both that the Bureau of
Prisons was powerless to modify his SAMs, which were in practice dictated by the Attorney
General, and that the Bureau of Prisons had acknowledged this fact by responding to Yousef’s
formal complaint with the statement that “this institution has no jurisdiction in this matter as the
Special Administrative Measures were issued from the Attorney General’s Office.”117 These
arguments failed to convince the court. To the contrary, Yousef’s case created precedent that
was quickly followed by a slew of courts in response to SAMs challenges.118
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exhaustion of administrative remedies was unnecessary. United States v. Basciano, 369 F. Supp.
2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). It is worth noting that this case was not a terrorism-associated
case. In 2008, two separate district courts found that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to
motions “brought to court in the context of an already-pending action” as opposed to new
actions. United States v. Hashmi, 621 F.Supp.2d 76, 85-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Ayyad v. Gonzales,
D.D.C. No. 05-cv-02342, Order of July 31, 2008. This was based on an analysis of the
legislative intent behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act , 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (from which the
exhaustion requirement stems), which they found to be one of lessening the financial burden on
courts. The relatively inexpensive nature of a new motion in an already existing action, as
opposed to the creation of an entirely new case and claim, led these courts to the conclusion that
the exhaustion requirement did not apply.
31

Forthcoming, 51 (1) Criminal Law Bulletin ___ (2014)

In these ways, judges allowed SAMs practice to become increasingly preventive in the
years preceding 2001; first by requiring less proximity to criminal activity prior to allowing
detention, and second by ceding oversight of SAMs to the executive branch. Even as the SAMs
regulations abandoned the requirement of hearings for extended confinement, and in the face of
BOP admission that no due process could be obtained through administrative review, the judicial
branch abandoned its oversight of the executive branch. This gave the executive branch
unchecked authority to detain defendants, pretrial (let alone pre-conviction), in solitary
confinement, in cases that would often go on for years before reaching trail.
The examples of Syed Hashmi and Mohamed Warsame are telling. Warsame’s
detention, which was spent entirely under SAMs, was claimed by his lawyers to have been the
longest in U.S. history.119 Warsame was known to have terrorist connections, to have trained at a
terrorist training camp, and to have been communicating with terrorists prior to his arrest. 120
However, the judge on Warsame’s case seemed unconvinced of his dangerousness, at one point
making a specific finding that SAMs were unnecessary.121 Even at sentencing, the judge
remained unconvinced of Warsame’s dangerousness.122 Yet in spite of both this hesitancy and
the judge’s order, Warsame’s SAMs were never removed.
As was mentioned above, the government’s evidence of dangerousness in the case of
Syed Hashmi seems similarly weak. Outside of the support he had provided to a high ranking

U.S. v. Warsame, Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Conditional Release from the Longest
Pretrial Imprisonment in United States History, July 13, 2008 (on file with author).
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U.S. v. Warsame sentencing transcript (on file with author). See also United States v.
Warsame memorandum opinion on sentencing August 24, 2009 (on file with author).
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U.S. v. Warsame Order on Motion for Release Based on Changed Circumstances, August 31,
2007, at 10 (on file with author).
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Warsame sentencing transcript, supra note 120, at 36-37.
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member of a terrorist group, the concern regarding Hashmi appeared to center around the
individuals he was associated with. The government alleged that Hashmi had served as a gobetween for two terrorists who had been involved with a terror conspiracy in the United
Kingdom, however it did not allege that Hashmi himself had any knowledge of how to build
bombs or engage in any other violent acts, or that he could direct (or even ask) these other
terrorists to engage in violence on his behalf. To the contrary, the government informant in the
case had stated that topics of importance were avoided in front of Hashmi, because he was an
outsider, not a member of al Qaeda, and rather a member of a public, political group that was not
involved in violence.123 A claim that Hashmi had made threats that terrorists would avenge his
being held in prison was dropped prior to a 2008 motion to renew Hashmi’s SAMs.124 Yet
Hashmi was held under SAMs for three years prior to his agreement to plead guilty, and has been
so confined since that plea.
The judicial abandonment in evidence in the El Hage and Yousef cases paved the way for
contemporary SAMs practice, overly preventive and insufficiently critical of government
allegations, such as in the Hashmi and Warsame cases described above. Those two cases show
the reaches of the preventive attitude in contemporary SAMs practice. It is difficult to see how,
in either case, sufficient evidence of a likelihood of dangerousness could have been presented to
justify the defendants’ detentions. Yet by early 2001 SAMs practice had become so preventive
that even the possibility of terrorist connections was sufficient for judges to abandon the SAMs
determination to the executive branch. Moreover, this development was, by late 2001, clearly
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established law. The case of Richard Reid shows how established SAMs practice was by this
time.
SAMs As A Foregone Conclusion: What We Learn from Richard Reid
Richard Reid was arrested after trying and failing to detonate a bomb in his shoe in
December of 2001, mere months after the 2001 attacks.125 Because Reid was arrested
immediately after a failed attack, not to mention so shortly after the 2001 attacks, it is
unsurprising that he was soon placed under SAMs. But the particular reaction of the judge
overseeing his case shows just how established SAMs practice was at that time.
In Judge Young, Richard Reid had happened to find a judge particularly ideologically
opposed to the extremities of the so-called “War on Terror.”

In 2003 he was quoted saying

“Mr. Reid is a very tall individual. But he’s not ten feet tall. And this constant reiteration of
we’ve got to keep data away from him, we’ve got to keep his data out of the hands of the public
lest disaster befall, respectfully, is wearing a bit thin.”126 He further expressed his concern that
the government was going to spirit Reid off to Guantanamo, a concern which had resulted in an
order that Reid not be moved without the prior permission of the court,127 and he maintained that
Reid’s attorneys would not be forced to sign the affirmation generally required in SAMs cases,
noting the ongoing prosecution of Lynne Stewart.128 In fact, upon first seeing the SAMs this
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judge had ordered the SAMs lifted,129 reasoning that “the SAMs did not apply to Reid, as he was
a pre-trial (sic) detainee presumed to be innocent.”130
Yet Judge Young not only ended up backtracking from his assertion of Reid’s presumed
innocence, he was outright embarrassed that he had ever said it. In July of 2002 Judge Young set
forth an opinion reinstating the SAMs and stating, in his words, he “botched it.”131 His opinion
drips with shame at the way in which he misread law. The extent of embarrassment of this
ideologically opposed judge suggests that the extent to which SAMs practice was established at
that time. Were SAMs not so clearly established to be within the prerogative of the executive
branch, with or without proof of dangerousness, it is highly unlikely that a judge so concerned
with the excesses of counterterrorism would respond with this embarrassment, rather than with a
careful and limited admission of the reasons SAMs were justified in Reid’s particular case.
Judge Young’s complete abdication of his objections shows that SAMs in 2002 were anything
but new or reactionary. Instead, Judge Young had to acknowledge they were already customary,
traditional, and generally accepted, hence his embarrassment at having foolishly seen them as
exceptional when first confronted with the issue. The general acceptance of SAMs is further
evident in the response from legal practitioners and academics, or more accurately, the lack
thereof. This lack is discussed in the next section.
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A Lackluster Response: The deafening silence of the legal community
If Judge Young’s embarrassment shows the judiciary’s acceptance of executive
authority to impose SAMs unilaterally, the silence of the legal community, both in practice and
in academia, shows its acceptance in the broader legal culture. Legal academia showed almost
no interest in the psychological hardship that the solitary confinement of SAMs entails, or in the
fact that defendants might be placed under SAMs with little or no articulated justification.
Instead, civil liberties advocates, defense attorneys, and legal scholars focused on the impact on
defendants’ abilities to aid in their representation, or the effect of the attorney/client monitoring
provision that was added to SAMs regulations in 2001. In fact, SAMs were almost entirely
ignored by the legal academic community until this provision was passed. Winter of 2001-2002
saw the publication of two articles, an exponential increase from the zero articles that had
published prior to 2001, both of which referenced SAMs solely in the context of the new
attorney/client monitoring provision.132
In the spring of 2002 the floodgates opened, and by December 2010 80 law review
articles and professional legal publications had made reference to SAMs. But of these articles,
55 mentioned SAMs solely in the context of either the Lynne Stewart case or the attorney/client
monitoring provision. Only ten articles mentioned solitary confinement in the context of SAMs
and outside of an introduction to the Stewart case, only six of these explore or even mention the
effects these conditions may have on the inmate. Even those articles that did discuss the
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psychological effect of SAMs emphasized the practical hurdles that SAMs create regarding trial
preparation, rather than the harsh nature of SAMs themselves.133
In reacting this way, legal academics appear to have been following the lead of the
practitioners working on the cases who had, over the years, abandoned any claims of
psychological hardship to their clients. In the early years of pretrial solitary confinement, the
effect of solitary on inmates’ well being comes up rarely, but it does appear. In Gotti, for
example, the opinion closes with recognition of the defendants’ “understandable desire to live as
comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement.”134 In
Suleiman, the judge opens his opinion by stating his sympathy for Suleiman’s claim that his
solitary confinement is affecting his mental health. In El Hage, the court acknowledged that El
Hage had already been held for a long period of time, and was likely to remain in solitary for
much longer, and seemed to be influenced at least in part by the fact that El Hage had already
been allowed to have a cellmate.135 Further, the very fact that El Hage’s conditions of
confinement had been modified in order to allow for a cellmate suggests some sensitivity on the
part of the district court.136
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Once again, the Yousef case stands as a seeming death knell for SAMs argument. Yousef
had clearly raised an argument regarding the effect solitary confinement had on his well-being—
his Eighth Amendment claims could be based on little else.137 But with the dismissal of
Yousef’s claim not only judges but defense attorneys seem to have abandoned the argument that
pretrial solitary confinement could be overseen on the basis of the effect it has on defendants.
Following this case, the argument that the solitary confinement included as an aspect of SAMs
was either punitive or simply cruel disappeared from the majority of cases.138 Where it was
brought – most often in pro se motions by convicted inmates at the Supermax facility in
Florence, Colorado -- it was quickly dismissed or abandoned.139
In other words, claims of hardship were brought only by persons who were not legally
educated, and who, one might say, could not see the writing on the wall. Defense attorneys, in
contrast, saw not only from SAMs cases but from conventional solitary confinement suits that
the Eighth Amendment was a losing argument. Aside from the generally accepted doctrine that
solitary confinement does not violate the Eighth Amendment, dismissals might be based on a
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failure to exhaust administrative remedies,140 or on the basis of mootness as SAMs were adjusted
and prisoners were transferred to new facilities.141 These responses echoed those in conventional
Supermax cases, where deference to prisons’ administrative decisions was clearly overtaking any
oversight role the judiciary had once played.142 By pressing claims of interference with trial
preparation instead, defense attorneys made a calculated effort to use an argument that
maintained some chance of winning. Their abandonment of the hardship argument shows once
again how fully established it was that imposition on defendants’ well-being was within the
prerogatives of the executive, even prior to any determination of guilt or dangerousness.
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Conclusion
SAMs provide an excellent case study of the devolving checks on the executive branch in
areas concerning public safety and suspected dangerous individuals. SAMs provide the harshest
imposition on liberty allowed in the criminal justice system outside of death, but may be imposed
on defendants who have not been convicted, have not been tried, and against whom the
government has provided no evidence of dangerousness or necessity for SAMs. Instead,
according to at least one prosecutor, an indictment on terrorism charges is sufficient to justify the
imposition of ADMAX solitary confinement. In the interests of public safety, all questions of
proof regarding the danger to the public disappear. In the interests of public safety, the executive
is allowed to make this decision unilaterally, with only a show of judicial oversight and no actual
questions asked.
The cases of Yousef and El Hage show that SAMs were established as an unchecked
executive prerogative prior to the 2001 terror attacks. While it is true that SAMs began as an
exceptional measure, applied only when judges were provided with adequate evidence of its
necessity, judges had abdicated this role prior to the terrorist attacks in September of 2001.
Moreover, examination of the rhetoric and doctrine used to justify that abdication locate the lack
of oversight of SAMs as part of the more general acceptance of ADMAX facilities, and the more
general abdication of oversight of those facilities.
The lack of surprise and attention paid to SAMs in the judiciary, the community of legal
practitioners, and the community of legal academics shows just how established this practice
was. The increasing number of suspected terrorists in our prisons seems to have more to do with
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the increased attention and accusation of “reflexive” application of SAMs than does any post2001 change in practice.
But can SAMs practice truly function as a case study in broader counter-terror excesses?
It can and does. SAMs practice is directly relevant to, for instance, the use of solitary
confinement at Guantanamo. SAMs not only represent a similar form of confinement, ADMAX
facilities were the model for solitary confinement at Guantanamo. Now that details of the
limitations on attorney/client conversations are emerging, it appears that these as well were based
off of SAMs restrictions.
When Rear Admiral D.B. Woods, Commander of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, issued
an order providing for review of each and every piece of writing passed between detainees and
their attorneys in December of 2011, a not-so-minor minor controversy erupted as defense
attorneys expressed their outrage over the new regulations.143 The ability to engage in privileged
conversation with clients is, in the words of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), “critical to
a true adversarial process.”144 This right was irreversibly damaged by the oversight proposed.
The Office of the Chief Defense Counsel at Guantanamo went so far as to issue a response
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directive recommending that detainees’ defense counsel refuse to comply with the Order. The
Ethics Advisory Committee of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers soon
issued an opinion supporting this response.145
Yet the Order itself claimed to be comparable to existing Bureau of Prisons [“BOP”]
regulations. In particular, the Order and its supporters pointed to provisions allowing for the use
of SAMs, including providing for monitoring of attorney-client communications, as comparable
to the new procedures.146
Most telling is the response sent to the New York City Bar Association, after that
Association wrote Jeh Johnson to complain about the procedures. The Association wrote to
detail the differences between the procedures implemented at Guantanamo and the extremely
limited manner in which SAMs are meant to be applied. General Mark Martins, having
reviewed the letter, replied that while the Association might be correct about the requirements to
implement SAMs de jure, in fact his observation of the ways in which SAMs were applied and
overseen suggested that the Guantanamo procedures were not nearly so far off.147
Of course, General Martins was correct. The Association had focused on the broad
sweep of the Guantanamo procedures, as far too vague and generalized to be comparable to
SAMs. Yet, as seen above, SAMs in practice are applied, now, to any defendant charged under a
terrorism statute, with almost no question or oversight as to the specific threat posed by the
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defendant.148 In other words, the government was quite well aware of the lack of oversight of
SAMs and preventive detention in Article III courts, and proceeded to demand that lack of
oversight in Guantanamo.
Indeed, the entire phenomenon of Guantanamo may be explained as a government effort
to claim the right to determine who needs to be punished, without the meddling interference of
judges or juries. In creating Guantanamo, as many authors have noticed, the government
endeavored to create the opportunity to act entirely without judicial oversight.149 Guantanamo
would allow the government to bypass frustrating limitations on the length of detention,
historically created to ensure a jury or judge would check government allegations and force
accusers to bring some proof of a reason to hold detainees.150 In other words, with Guantanamo,
with black sites, and with drone strikes, the government found a way to avoid being caught up in
any argument over the guilt or innocence of detainees.
While black sites, drone strikes, and the use of indefinite detention at Guantanamo are
extreme measures, the lack of oversight they display are not so far from the use of “short cuts”
and “end-runs” around judicial oversight seen in late 20th century criminal justice alternatives.
Yet SAMs may be an example of a “missing link” in comparisons between U.S. counterterror
policies and U.S. criminal justice. Through SAMs, the connection between accepted criminal
justice practices and the application of those practices to the pursuit of terror suspects can be
seen. Rather than relying on vague accusations that the U.S. criminal justice system was already
“harsh,” “preventive,” or “unilateral,” the development of SAMs shows just how the decrease in
148
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judicial oversight led to an exceptionally harsh and reflexive form of confinement, which, in fact,
was used as a model for more infamous counterterror policies. In this way, SAMs bridge the gap
between domestic and international practices of detention and confinement, showing how much
of this effort the executive had already accomplished towards unilateral preventive detention in
the criminal justice system, over the course of the 20th century.
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